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 ∗ Editor’s Note: Professor Bonnie became involved in Joe Giarratano’s 
case in 1979. After a bench trial in which the trial judge rejected an insanity 
plea, the court ordered Giarratano to undergo a psychiatric examination at the 
Forensic Psychiatry Clinic at the University of Virginia for possible use at the 
capital sentencing proceeding. Professor Bonnie observed the clinical evaluation 
and consulted with the Clinic staff as they developed their opinions and wrote 
the Clinic’s report. Because Giarratano had confessed to the killings, had been 
convicted of committing them, and did not deny his guilt, the evaluators 
assumed he was guilty and focused entirely on possible mitigating factors, 
including whether Giarratano had experienced emotional disturbance and 
impaired volitional capacity at the time of the offenses.  
After Giarratano was sentenced to death and the Virginia Supreme Court had 
affirmed the conviction and sentence, Giarratano declined to seek any further 
judicial review. As the execution date neared, Professor Bonnie went to see 
Giarratano at the request of anti-death penalty advocacy groups. Concluding 
that Giarratano was acutely distressed and possibly psychotic, Professor Bonnie 
attempted to persuade him to authorize the initiation of post-conviction 
proceedings while efforts were also undertaken to obtain psychiatric treatment 
for him. Giarratano equivocated, but eventually authorized Professor Bonnie 
and co-counsel to seek a stay and file a state habeas petition.  
For several years, Giarratano vacillated about whether he wanted to 
terminate the proceedings as they moved unsuccessfully through state courts 
and thereafter in the federal district court. A central claim of the federal 
petition was that Giarratano had not been competent to assist counsel in 
connection with the sentencing proceedings. The district court denied relief on 
this claim in 1986. Over the years of 1986 and 1987, however, the entire 
narrative of the case changed as newly discovered evidence raised serious 
doubts about whether Giarratano had actually committed the murders. At that 
point, with Giarratano’s unequivocal support, the federal habeas petition was 
amended to extend the competency claim to the guilt phase of the trial. 
After the Fourth Circuit denied relief, Professor Bonnie participated in 
drafting and advocating the successful petition for a conditional pardon and has 
also written in support of Giarratano’s requests for parole which has thus far 
proven fruitless. 
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Abstract 
Joe Giarratano was on death row for twelve years, and 
remains incarcerated today, because mental illness and severe 
emotional distress wholly undermined reliable adjudication in his 
case. Using Giarratano’s remarkable story as a case study, I 
illustrate some of the ways in which mental illness and acute 
emotional distress can lead to unreliable findings and judgments 
and—even worse—can actually propel the criminal justice system 
toward a death sentence. I cover the unreliability of his confession, 
his impaired ability to assist counsel, his impaired capacity to 
make a rational decision regarding whether to initiate or continue 
post-conviction proceedings, his diminished mental responsibility 
at the time of the alleged offenses if he actually committed them, 
and an issue that fortunately never arose—his competence to be 
executed. 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1446 
 II. Reliability of Confessions .............................................. 1449 
 III. Competence to Assist Counsel ....................................... 1454 
 IV. Competence to Decide Whether to Seek or  
  Terminate Post-Conviction Relief ................................. 1460 
 V. Diminished Responsibility and Proportionality ............ 1462 
 VI. Competence to Be Executed .......................................... 1465 
 VII. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1466 
I. Introduction 
Mental disability can undermine the reliability and fairness 
of capital adjudication at every stage of the process, from the 
defendant’s very first interaction with law enforcement to the 
waning minutes before a scheduled execution.1 Giarratano’s case 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense 
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illustrates many of these problems, ranging from his unreliable 
confessions during police interrogation to his impaired decisional 
capacity while on death row.2  
A cardinal principle of Eighth Amendment death penalty 
jurisprudence is the heightened need for reliability in the 
determination that a defendant is guilty of a capital offense and 
that imposition of the penalty of death is legally authorized and 
morally warranted in the defendant’s particular case.3 In Atkins 
v. Virginia,4 the Supreme Court precluded capital punishment for 
defendants with intellectual disability, noting the many ways in 
which intellectual disability can undermine the reliability of 
capital adjudication: 
The risk “that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of 
factors which may call for a less severe penalty,” Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 605 (1978), is enhanced [in cases involving 
defendants with intellectual disability], not only by the 
possibility of false confessions, but also by the lesser ability of 
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of 
mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more 
aggravating factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less 
able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are 
typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an 
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their 
crimes. . . . [M]oreover, reliance on mental retardation as a 
mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance 
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future 
dangerousness will be found by the [judge or] jury. Mentally 
                                                                                                     
Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate, or 
Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65 (1988) (discussing the challenges of 
representing mentally ill defendants); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s 
Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next 
Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (discussing the legal issues surrounding 
mentally ill defendants and capital punishment, including blameworthiness, 
jury determinations, and competence for trial).  
 2. See infra Parts II & IV (exploring the reliability of a defendant’s 
confessions and a defendant’s competence to make decisions about post-
conviction relief). 
 3. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998–99 (1983) (“[T]he 
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a 
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing 
determination.”).   
 4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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retarded defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of 
wrongful execution.5 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s firm declaration in 
Atkins, Professor David Bruck has shown that our system has 
failed, in practice, to prevent the execution of defendants who 
have been diagnosed as having an intellectual disability.6 Our 
system also had virtually no impact on the much larger number 
of cases in which intellectual impairments can impede reliable 
adjudications, including those impairments that fall short of a 
diagnosis of intellectual disability.7  
Fortunately, Joe Giarratano has a first-class intellect and a 
sterling character. He was on death row for twelve years and 
remains incarcerated today, however, because mental illness and 
severe emotional distress wholly undermined reliable 
adjudication in his case.8 Using Giarratano’s remarkable story as 
a case study, I illustrate some of the ways in which mental illness 
and acute emotional distress can lead to unreliable findings and 
judgments and, even worse, can actually propel the criminal 
justice system toward a death sentence.9 I address the 
unreliability of Giarratano’s confession,10 his impaired ability to 
assist counsel,11 his impaired capacity to make a rational decision 
regarding whether to initiate or continue post-conviction 
proceedings,12 his diminished mental responsibility at the time of 
                                                                                                     
 5. Id. at 320–21. 
 6. See Professor David Bruck, Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse Clinic 
Director at Wash. & Lee U. Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the Washington and 
Lee University School of Law Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: From 
Conviction to Clemency: Commonwealth v. Giarratano, A Case Study in the 
Modern Death Penalty (Feb. 6, 2016) (discussing the use of capital punishment 
for individuals with mental illness and intellectual disability). 
 7. See generally id.  
 8. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (discussing Giarratano’s 
mental health issues at the time of his trial).  
 9. See infra Parts II–VI (examining various issues related to the mental 
capacity of death penalty defendants). 
 10. See infra Part II (discussing the reliability of confessions). 
 11. See infra Part III (considering the consequences in a death penalty case 
when a defendant is unable to assist counsel). 
 12. See infra Part IV (exploring whether a defendant has competence to 
seek or terminate post-conviction relief). 
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the alleged offenses if he actually committed them,13 and an issue 
that fortunately never arose—his competence to be executed.14 
II. Reliability of Confessions 
The first problem with the reliability of confessions is the 
risk of a false confession. Although Giarratano appears to have no 
memory of having committed these crimes, he reached the 
conclusion that he was responsible upon waking up in the 
apartment and seeing the victims’ bodies.15 By convincing 
himself of his culpability, Giarratano undermined all the rules 
and safeguards that our system provides to prevent conviction of 
the innocent. Perhaps the most important of these safeguards is 
the requirement that the prosecution bear the heavy burden of 
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.16 
Giarratano relieved the police of the burden of investigating the 
case and relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving his 
guilt.17 This problem infected everything that followed—the 
police made no effort to corroborate the confession(s) or even to 
resolve inconsistencies among them.18 Giarratano was 
                                                                                                     
13. See infra Part V (examining the challenges associated with diminished 
responsibility). 
 14. See infra Part VI (describing the impact such a consideration might 
have had in Giarratano’s case). 
 15. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.3d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting 
Giarratano’s affidavit in which he stated “I do not know whether I murdered 
Toni and Michelle or not. Since the night I woke up in their apartment, I have 
always assumed, convinced myself I was guilty; but, I never had any actual 
memory of committing the murders”).  
 16. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all 
of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant 
is charged.”).  
 17. See Procunier, 891 F.3d at 485 (explaining that Giarratano confessed to 
the crime on multiple occasions).  
 18. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1067–69 (1980) 
(detailing the content of Giarratano’s multiple confessions); see also In re Joseph 
M. Giarratano: Petition for Conditional Pardon by the Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, at 30–31 (1991) [hereinafter Giarratano Petition for 
Conditional Pardon] (describing inconsistencies in Giarratano’s various 
confessions).  
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unmotivated to defend himself and therefore made no effort to 
assist counsel.19 Indeed, his indifference to defending himself and 
his desire for the death penalty undermined his lawyer’s 
motivation to defend him and, pretty clearly, his lawyer’s efforts 
to do so.20 No one, including Giarratano or his lawyer, made the 
police and prosecution do their jobs. Moreover, in the effort to 
identify possible mitigating claims focused on his mental state at 
the time of the offenses, the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic staff 
invited Giarratano to speculate about why he might have 
committed crimes that he had such a questionable recollection for 
having committed, and the resulting speculation made its way 
into the judge’s sentencing memorandum.21  
The impact of the unreliable confession did not end with the 
conviction and sentence. It also infected the post-conviction 
proceedings. Habeas representation was entirely a pro bono effort 
at that time and it did not occur to habeas counsel, including me, 
to question Giarratano’s guilt or to review the evidence bearing 
on the conviction. As for the sentence, the Forensic Clinic staff 
had developed a fairly detailed social history and psychological 
formulation that was itself rare in the early days of post-1976 
capital representation.22 The findings of that report supported a 
compelling case in mitigation based on diminished mental and 
emotional capacity. Given the trial record, the state habeas 
petition did not question the legality of the conviction.23 Instead it 
challenged the constitutionality of the “future dangerousness” 
predicate in the capital sentencing statutes on its face and as 
applied in Giarratano’s case, objected to constitutional errors 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 18, at 2  
(“He refused to defend himself. In his mind he was guilty and deserved to die. 
He tried to take his own life several times before trial. Failing that, he 
orchestrated his defense to assure his death. He refused to plead guilty in 
exchange for a life sentence.”).  
 20. See id. at 64 (explaining that because Giarratano was so convinced of 
his own guilt, “his attorney simply assumed that Mr. Giarratano was guilty”).  
 21. See Giarratano, 220 Va. at 1077 (discussing the Forensic Psychiatry 
Clinic’s testimony about Giarratano’s “symbolic” reasons for committing the 
crime).  
 22. See id. at 1075–78 (describing the social history the Forensic Psychiatry 
Clinic compiled).  
 23. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(describing the claims raised in Giarratano’s state habeas petition). 
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relating to the use of psychiatric testimony to prove 
dangerousness, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.24 A 
key contribution of the state habeas proceedings, however, was 
the testimony of Giarratano’s trial counsel, who depicted the 
struggles he confronted in coping with Giarratano’s 
uncooperative and self-defeating behavior, including Giarratano’s 
letter to the trial judge requesting a death sentence and his 
opposition to filing a direct appeal.25 Giarratano’s emotional 
insistence on execution for his evil deeds was obviously more 
intense than we had realized.26 As discussed below, these 
realizations led us to develop a then-novel theory that 
Giarratano was not emotionally able to assist his attorney or to 
make rational decisions about the defense of the case.27 
In 1986, the reliability of Giarratano’s confession, and his 
guilt, were called into doubt for the first time by newly discovered 
evidence—evidence that could have been discovered from the 
outset if any of us had been motivated to look for it and had had 
the resources to do so.28 The fact that the prosecution had not 
revealed the existence of confessions that contradicted key 
statements in the confession used in court, as well as the 
discovery of evidence implicating other suspects, raised genuine 
doubts about the conviction, thus leading to the filing of an 
                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2; see also Procunier, 891 F.2d at 
485 (“The [state habeas] court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . . [T]he state habeas court ruled 
that Giarratano’s trial counsel afforded him competent representation.”). 
 25. See Giarratano v. Procunier, No. 83-185, at 12 (E.D. Va. June 25, 1986) 
(“Giarratano’s self-destructive tendencies led to his August 16 letter to Judge 
McNamara requesting the death penalty and to two subsequent letters to the 
same judge asking that his execution date be advanced.”).  
 26. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 10, at 38–39 
(explaining that after discovering the bodies of Barbara and Michelle Kline, 
Giarratano’s “belief in his guilt became entrenched, and as it did he came to see 
himself as evil and as deserving to die”).  
 27. See Giarratano, No. 83-185, at 11–12 (describing Giarratano’s claims 
that his mental state limited his ability “to provide his counsel with the 
information he needed to effectively present a case in mitigation at the 
sentencing hearing”).  
 28. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 10, at 53–62 
(describing inconsistencies between Giarratano’s confessions and physical 
evidence and discussing evidence suggesting that someone else committed the 
murders). 
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amended federal habeas petition29 and eventually to a successful 
request for gubernatorial clemency.30 Naturally I have wondered 
whether we should have been more skeptical about the confession 
from the outset. As already indicated, it was clear even then that 
Giarratano’s ability to recall the events during the time period 
before, during, and after the killings was severely impaired.31 
Indeed, Giarratano’s impaired memory was apparent to the 
psychiatrist at Central State Hospital,32 who had evaluated 
Giarratano’s competence to stand trial when he attempted to 
commit suicide in jail after his arrest.33 The Central State 
psychiatrist diagnosed Giarratano as having Korsakoff’s 
Syndrome, a severe impairment of memory attributable to 
organic brain damage associated with chronic alcohol and drug 
intoxication.34  
In any event, the fact is that no one questioned the 
reliability of Giarratano’s confession until eight years later.35 
Could this happen today? As Richard Leo36 and Brandon 
                                                                                                     
 29. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(describing the procedural history of Giarratano’s federal habeas appeal and 
noting that Giarratano amended his petition to include a claim that he was 
incompetent to participate in the sentencing proceeding).  
 30. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia Governor Blocks Execution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 20, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/20/us/virginia-governor-
blocks-an-execution.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2016) (describing the 
circumstances that led to Governor Wilder’s decision to commute Giarratano’s 
sentence) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 31. See Procunier, 891 F.3d at 486 (discussing Giarratano’s lack of memory 
surrounding the murders).  
 32. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1071 (1980) (noting 
Dr. Ryans’s explanation for Giarratano’s memory loss surrounding the crimes).  
 33.  See id. at 1069 (explaining that Giarratano’s “‘mental difficulties’ 
[warranted] emergency hospitalization at Central State Hospital”).  
 34. See id. at 1071 (discussing Dr. Ryans’s testimony that inconsistency in 
Giarratano’s confessions was due to memory loss from drug abuse and that 
individuals with that type of memory loss “can’t get it straight in their mind so 
they confabulate . . . consistent with what we call a Korsakoff’s syndrome”).  
 35. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 487 (1989) (“[Giarratano] 
alleged newly discovered evidence discrediting the facts proved by the 
Commonwealth that corroborated his confession.”). 
 36. See Professor Richard Leo, Hamill Family Chair Professor of L. & Soc. 
Psychol., U. of San Francisco Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the Washington and 
Lee University School of Law Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: From 
Conviction to Clemency: Commonwealth v. Giarratano, A Case Study in the 
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Garrett37 observed at this Symposium, the problem of unreliable 
confessions is much more widely understood today and the 
standard of practice for capital defense is much more demanding 
than it was in 1979.38 We expect more of trial counsel—and of 
habeas counsel as well. Especially in a capital case, the properly 
trained trial lawyer will scrutinize every item of prosecution 
evidence and will put the State on notice that corroboration for a 
confession is essential.39 The existence of contradictory 
confessions would likely have been revealed by adequate 
discovery, and it would have made a huge difference if 
Giarratano’s confession(s) had been recorded. To sum up my 
point, Giarratano’s mental and emotional condition led him to 
confess to crimes that he did not remember and may not have 
committed.40 Yet, despite the indicia of unreliability, the problem 
was not noticed at trial or in an entire round of state and federal 
habeas proceedings.41  
                                                                                                     
Modern Death Penalty (Feb. 5, 2016) (discussing capital punishment and actual 
innocence claims).  
 37. See generally Brandon Garrett, Confession Contamination Revisited, 
101 VA. L. REV. 395 (2015) (discussing false confessions that were contaminated 
during interrogation and arguing that courts should investigate reliability 
consistent with scientific research into the false confession phenomenon). See 
also Professor Brandon Garrett, Justice Thurgood Marshall Professor of L., U. of 
Va. Sch. of L., Panel Discussion at the Washington and Lee University School of 
Law Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: From Conviction to Clemency: 
Commonwealth v. Giarratano, A Case Study in the Modern Death Penalty (Feb. 
5, 2016) (discussing remedies for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
 38. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 388 (2005) (discussing a 
defense attorney’s duty to investigate aggravating evidence); Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 523–24 (2003) (explaining that defense attorneys must attempt to 
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence as well as evidence to 
rebut aggravating circumstances). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR 
THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES (rev. ed. Feb. 2003) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT] 
(providing recommendation for capital defense counsel from appointment 
through post-conviction and clemency proceedings).  
 39. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (“The duty to investigate exists 
regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts 
constituting guilt or the accused’s desire to plead guilty.” (quoting STANDARDS 
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2d ed. 1982 Supp.))).  
 40. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (discussing Giarratano’s 
memory and mental state at the time of the murders and the trial).  
 41. See supra notes 28 & 33 and accompanying text (discussing the 
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III. Competence to Assist Counsel 
Giarratano’s case presents a fairly common scenario in 
capital homicide cases. He twice attempted to commit suicide in 
jail after his arrest, thereby triggering an evaluation of his 
competence to stand trial—as it virtually always does—even 
before counsel had been notified.42 He was also put on anti-
psychotics during the pretrial period.43 In many of these cases, 
the defendant is actively seeking a death sentence and, in others, 
the defendant may feel that a death sentence is inevitable.44 
Either way, the defendant’s lack of motivation to assist counsel is 
often accompanied by overt efforts to subvert counsel.45 What 
typically happens in these cases is that the defendant pleads 
guilty (sometimes over counsel’s objection) and invites the judge 
to impose the death penalty.46 The tensions in the attorney-client 
relationship are often invisible to everyone else except counsel. 
That is effectively what happened in Giarratano’s case as we now 
know that he essentially undermined counsel every step of the 
way. He turned down a possible plea agreement and insisted on a 
                                                                                                     
discovery of evidence calling the accuracy of Giarratano’s confessions into 
question).   
 42. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1069–70 (1980) 
(describing the circumstances of Giarratano’s initial competency evaluation).  
 43. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 10, at 15 
(“From the day of his arrest, throughout his trial and for his first four years on 
death row, Joe was administered Thorazine, at times up to 900 mg per day, and 
other psychotropic drugs.”). 
 44. See Richard J. Bonnie, Symposium, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death 
Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 
1189 (2005) [hereinafter Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners] (explaining that 
prisoners who are competent may opt for execution out of feelings of “guilt and 
remorse,” a situation that is particularly problematic if those feelings “take[] 
root immediately after the crime”). 
 45. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392 (1993) (explaining that Moran 
fired his attorneys and changed his pleas to guilty to avoid presenting 
mitigating evidence).  
 46. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond 
Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 588 (1993) [hereinafter Bonnie, The 
Competence of Criminal Defendants] (“Such defendants typically insist on 
pleading guilty against counsel’s advice and instruct counsel to refrain from 
introducing any evidence in mitigation, or like Richard Moran, they discharge 
their attorneys and plead guilty while represented. These defendants also 
frequently request sentences of death.”). 
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bench trial.47 He wrote to the judge asking for a death sentence.48 
He directed counsel not to appeal the conviction and sentence 
(although counsel filed a pro forma appeal because he concluded 
that he was required to do so).49 
Of what legal significance is this fairly common scenario? Is a 
capital defendant who seeks a death sentence, and undermines 
counsel’s efforts to defend him, incompetent to stand trial? The 
books are replete with cases where these defendants are ruled to 
be competent to stand trial.50 The psychiatrist who examined 
Giarratano at Central State after his suicide attempt found him 
competent to stand trial because Giarratano understood the 
charges and the proceedings against him, understood the role of 
counsel, and was able to communicate coherently with his 
attorney.51 Furthermore, the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic staff 
raised no doubts about his competence to stand trial.52 Indeed, it 
is clear that Giarratano appreciated his jeopardy and was not 
experiencing delusions, disorganized thinking, or other cognitive 
deficits that are usually the focus of assessments of competence to 
stand trial.53 Clearly he did not lack the ability to assist counsel 
in the usual sense.54 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 18, at 2–3 
(“He refused to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. Afraid that even an 
unconditional guilty plea would result in a life sentence, he assured his 
conviction by opting for a bench trial and asserting a defense that had no factual 
support.”). 
 48. See id. at 3 (“Upon conviction, he asked that the judge sentence him to 
death.”).  
 49. See id. at 15 (noting that Giarratano’s direct appeal took place in 1980).  
 50. See, e.g., Godinez, 509 U.S. at 392 (explaining that the trial court found 
Moran competent to stand trial, to waive his right to an attorney, and to plead 
guilty). See generally Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. 
L. REV. 1363 (1988) [hereinafter Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned] 
(discussing obligations of attorneys and courts when capital defendants elect to 
be executed). 
 51. Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1070 (1980).  
 52. See id. at 1076–77 (discussing evidence presented by the Forensic 
Clinic).  
 53. See id. at 1070 (explaining that the Central State psychiatrist 
concluded that Giarratano was “suffering from a ‘transitional disturbance of 
adult life with anxiety manifestations’” and there was no evidence of “mental 
illness or feeblemindedness”). 
 54. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (explaining that 
the test for competency to stand trial is “whether he has sufficient present 
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This issue is fundamentally about motivation. How should 
the courts respond to lack of motivation to defend oneself? Does it 
matter why the defendant isn’t motivated? We have all seen 
obstreperous clients who create autonomy fights with counsel, 
but capital cases raise the stakes qualitatively higher.55 Is a 
suicidal defendant competent to stand trial? A depressed 
defendant? A defendant who believes he deserves to die? A 
defendant who is traumatized by the homicidal encounter? There 
was plenty of evidence in Giarratano’s case of acute emotional 
distress but was he unable to assist counsel or did he choose not 
to assist counsel? This is a complicated clinical question that 
ultimately requires a value judgment. We concluded, based on 
expert consultation, that his depressed mental state and near-
psychotic level of distress were attributable to psychopathological 
factors beyond his control and that his emotional distress and 
agitation became more intense as the proceedings neared a 
climax—initially the trial itself and pronouncement of a death 
sentence and then the prospect of execution.56 It is likely that 
active treatment with anti-depressants as well as psychotherapy 
could have been effective in restoring Giarratano’s capacity to 
exercise reasoned judgment, but no such treatment was 
attempted.57  
We can easily see why courts might be reluctant to hold, 
categorically, that depressed or distressed defendants are not 
competent to proceed. Malingering could be a serious problem for 
one thing, and, even if the depression is genuine, bringing the 
criminal process to a halt while depressed defendants are being 
treated on the basis of the diagnosis alone is probably not 
sensible. The key issue is functional impairment of decisional 
                                                                                                     
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and whether he has a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him”). 
 55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (“[T]he penalty of death 
is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of 
criminal justice.”). 
 56. See Giarratano Petition for Conditional Pardon, supra note 18, at 71 
(discussing Giarratano’s mental state during his trial and its impact on his 
ability to participate in his defense).  
 57. See id. at 70–71 (noting that during federal habeas proceedings, 
Giarratano’s mental health improved “as a result of intensive, sustained 
therapy”).  
MENTAL ILLNESS, SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 1457 
capacity. The question should be whether the defendant’s 
emotional condition is symptomatic of a clinically diagnosable 
disorder and is interfering materially with his ability to make a 
rational, self-interested decision about the defense or disposition 
of the case.58 The typical contexts in which this problem arises 
are cases in which the defendant insists on pleading guilty over 
counsel’s objection, refuses to accept a plea agreement that would 
preclude a death sentence, refuses to put on a case in mitigation 
or otherwise contest a death sentence, or resolves the “autonomy 
fight” with counsel by waiving his right to counsel and invoking 
his right to represent himself under Faretta v. California.59 
Giarratano’s case highlights the importance of distinguishing 
between a defendant’s abilities to understand the proceedings, 
appreciate his jeopardy, and communicate rationally with 
counsel, on the one hand, and his decisional capacity, on the 
other. What Giarratano lacked was the capacity to make rational, 
self-interested decisions.60 I hasten to add that I am not saying 
that every defendant who would prefer to be executed lacks 
decisional capacity. I have taken the opposite position.61 
Attorneys must, however, undertake a capacity assessment.62 
I have seen enough of these cases to convince me that a 
suicide attempt or other clinically significant symptoms of 
depression should raise a red flag and invite ongoing assessments 
                                                                                                     
 58. See Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners, supra note 44, at 1186–87 
(discussing a defendant’s mental illness and ability to make decisions and work 
with attorneys).   
 59. See 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975) (concluding that a defendant in a criminal 
trial has a constitutional right to proceed without an attorney if he makes a 
voluntary and intelligent choice to do so). 
 60. Representing Giarratano in his post-conviction proceedings informed 
my scholarly writings on the subject of competence for criminal adjudication. 
See the theory developed in Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal 
Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (1992) and 
further elaborated in The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 46.  
 61. See Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 50, at 1367 (“I 
have refused, however to become involved in other cases in which a prisoner 
whose competence was not in doubt similarly expressed a preference for 
execution.”).  
 62. See GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT, supra note 38, at 4.1 & cmt. 
(discussing the importance of evaluating a defendant’s mental state and 
competence in capital trials).  
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of a defendant’s competence for adjudication in capital cases.63 
Moreover, even if the defendant is regarded as competent for 
adjudication, it does not follow that justice is well-served by 
bringing the defendant to trial in this condition. The State should 
not be in a hurry to bring defendants with suicidal wishes and 
treatable depression to trial. Practice guidelines for capital 
representation should also advise counsel how to recognize 
symptoms of depression, how to respond to those symptoms—
especially to suicidal ideation and behavior—and how to 
ameliorate possible adverse impact on the attorney-client 
relationship and on client decision-making.64  
None of this was done in Giarratano’s case. As mentioned 
above, we argued in post-conviction proceedings that Giarratano 
had been incompetent to assist counsel during the pre-trial period 
and that proceeding to adjudication under these circumstances 
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to effective 
assistance of counsel and to a fair trial.65 Unfortunately, the 
claim never got any traction in the courts.66 The degree of 
Giarratano’s emotional distress and its impact on the 
performance of trial counsel only became apparent in the state 
habeas. The federal habeas petition, as amended in 1983, raised 
the claim that Giarratano had been unable to assist counsel due 
to his emotional condition.67 Like the state petition, the federal 
petition only challenged the death sentence and did not seek to 
set aside the conviction.68 Although, in retrospect, this was a 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants, supra note 46, at 
575 (noting that various symptoms of mental illness and disorders, including 
depression, “may impair a defendant’s capacity to weigh information in order to 
make rational choices”).  
 64. See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT supra note 38, at 4.1.A.2 
(“The defense team should contain at least one member qualified by training 
and experience to screen individuals for the presence of mental or psychological 
disorders or impairments.”).  
 65. Supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (discussing the claims of 
Giarratano’s habeas petition).  
 66. See Giarratano v. Procunier, 891 F.2d 483, 485 (4th Cir. 1989) (listing 
the procedural postures of Giarratano’s various appeals).  
 67. See id. at 486 (discussing Giarratano’s competency claims and noting 
that “‘the gravamen of his claims has always been that he lacked the capacity to 
provide information to counsel that was necessary to construct his defense’” 
(quoting Giarratano’s amended habeas petition)). 
 68. See id. at 484–85 (listing the claims in Giarratano’s appeal  from the 
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huge mistake, it seemed like a prudent move at the time. Why 
invite the court to rule that Giarratano had been incompetent to 
stand trial and to set aside a conviction that was not in doubt? 
His mental and emotional disorder had driven him to seek the 
death penalty and rendered him incapable of assisting counsel in 
connection with the sentencing proceeding.69 Granting the relief 
we sought would not require a new trial, only a new sentencing 
proceeding. While the case was still under consideration in the 
district court, however, the newly discovered evidence discussed 
earlier raised genuine doubt about the conviction and we then 
sought to amend the petition to challenge the conviction as well.  
In response to the State’s argument that procedural default 
barred review of the validity of the conviction, we argued that the 
seriousness of Giarratano’s disability had been completely 
obscured by his unshakeable belief in his own guilt and the 
failure of his counsel to seek assistance in dealing with his 
obviously self-destructive client after the initial request for a 
competence evaluation.70 We contended that his lawyer was 
ineffective for failing to raise the issue as the case proceeded and 
that the judge also denied Giarratano due process by failing to 
raise the issue sua sponte at the time of sentencing. The district 
court denied relief on our competency claim as it pertained to the 
sentence and denied leave to amend the petition to extend the 
claim to the conviction due to procedural default.71 The Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both competency claims without 
discussing our motivationally grounded decisional capacity claim, 
deferring to the state trial court’s original finding that Giarratano 
was competent to stand trial.72 
                                                                                                     
district court’s denial of habeas corpus, which focused on sentencing and 
competency).  
 69. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (discussing Giarratano’s 
behavior during the trial). 
 70. See Procunier, 891 F.2d at 485–86 (discussing the claims Giarratano 
raised in his federal appeal).  
 71. See id. at 486 (describing the procedural posture of Giarratano’s motion 
to amend his petition in the district court).  
 72. See id. at 486–87 (rejecting Giarratano’s competency challenge and 
affirming the district court). The procedural history of the post-conviction 
litigation is summarized by Judge Butzner in the panel opinion. Id. at 485–86. 
The deferential stance taken by the Fourth Circuit is typical of its approach to 
death penalty cases in the post-Furman era.  
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IV. Competence to Decide Whether to Seek or Terminate Post-
Conviction Relief 
I want to turn now to another issue that Giarratano’s case 
raised—the proper response to concerns about the capacity of a 
condemned prisoner to decide whether to seek or terminate post-
conviction relief. This problem is typically an extension of the 
dynamic I just discussed in the pre-trial context. In many cases 
where capital defendants attempt suicide, subvert their own 
defense, and request a death sentence, the judge or jury obliges 
and the defendant finds himself on death row.73 With the passage 
of time, however, many of these condemned prisoners change 
their minds.74 That very fact should be a sufficient reason for 
trial courts to routinely assure treatment of depressed and 
suicidal defendants, monitor their competence, and readily grant 
continuances to enable counsel to establish and preserve a 
trusting productive relationship.  
Giarratano, however, did not change his mind. After the 
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction and death 
sentence, his appointed attorney’s obligation expired. He had no 
duty to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court and 
none was filed. Nor did Giarratano seek representation to file a 
state habeas. An execution date was set and the clock was 
ticking. Several anti-death penalty advocacy groups took interest 
and requested me to go and see him. That visit began a deeply 
draining process. He initially said no to post-conviction 
proceedings. I prepared a contingency plan to file a petition as 
“next friend” on my own without his consent based on my own 
judgment that he was not competent to make a rational self-
interested decision regarding whether or not to seek post-
conviction relief. Eventually we worked out a plan in which he 
agreed to allow Lloyd Snook and me to file a petition for a stay 
and post-conviction relief while we attempted to get him the 
                                                                                                     
 73. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392–93 (1993) (explaining 
that after the defendant waived his right to counsel and pleaded guilty, “a three-
judge court sentenced [him] to death”).  
 74. See Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners, supra note 44, at 1188–89 (“It 
should be emphasized, however, that many prisoners are likely to change their 
minds (authorizing post-conviction proceedings) as a result of successful [mental 
health] treatment.”). 
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psychiatric attention he needed. What followed during the next 
several years was an off-and-on process in which Giarratano 
would direct us to pull the plug and Lloyd Snook and Marie 
Deans would convince him to relent. Eventually, after newly 
discovered evidence raised genuine doubt about Giarratano’s 
guilt, Giarratano joined unequivocally in the effort to save his 
life.75 
Much has been written on the ethical dilemmas faced by 
counsel in cases where his or her clients seek to terminate post-
conviction proceedings and on the proper response of the legal 
system when a condemned prisoner “volunteers” for execution, 
seeking “state-assisted suicide.”76 I will not attempt to summarize 
that debate here. In a word, my view is that we should respect 
the dignity of condemned prisoners to make their own decisions 
about whether to abandon legally available opportunities to 
overturn their death sentences as long as they are competent to 
make rational self-interested decisions based on their own 
values.77 This view is reflected in the ABA’s Resolution on Mental 
Disability and the Death Penalty and in the companion position 
statements of the American Psychiatric Association and the 
American Psychological Association.78  
                                                                                                     
 75. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the discovery of 
new exculpatory evidence in Giarratano’s case). 
 76. See generally Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 50 
(analyzing problems of client autonomy to waive appeals against social interest 
in capital punishment); John Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide 
and Competency, 103 MICH. L REV. 939 (2004) (analyzing similarities between 
“volunteers” for execution and suicidal persons and identifying a standard to 
ensure death row inmates do not use the death penalty as a form of suicide). 
 77. See Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 50, at 1390–91 
(discussing essential factors to examine when a prisoner “volunteers” for 
execution).  
 78. See ABA Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 
Recommendations and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental 
Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 673 (2006) 
[hereinafter ABA Task Force] (“Any meaningful competence inquiry in this 
context must focus not only on the prisoner’s understanding of the consequences 
of the decision, but also on his or her reasons for wanting to surrender, and on 
the rationality of the prisoner’s thinking and reasoning.”); see also Bonnie, 
Mentally Ill Prisoners, supra note 44, at 1184 (“[R]espect for the dignity of the 
defendant or condemned prisoner requires counsel to adhere to the wishes of a 
competent client . . . .”). 
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V. Diminished Responsibility and Proportionality 
Joe Giarratano was the third person to be sentenced to death 
in Virginia during the post-Furman79 era. How Virginia’s newly 
structured capital sentencing statute would be interpreted and 
administered remained unclear. One overarching question that 
has still not been satisfactorily resolved relates to the basic moral 
structure of capital sentencing and particularly to the 
relationship between aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.80  
Having observed numerous capital sentencing evaluations at 
the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic over the past forty years, I have 
had an ongoing opportunity to reflect on the legal and moral 
implications of the clinical narratives that emerge in these cases. 
One recurrent question is whether the aggravating circumstances 
will do all the work, completely marginalizing the mitigation 
narratives that might be derived from childhood abuse and 
deprivation, mental disability, situational pressures, or the 
“diverse frailties of humankind.”81 Specifically in connection with 
mental disability, will jurors, judges, and appellate courts ever 
allow compelling mitigating factors to override the momentum 
toward the death penalty created by a narrowed list of capital 
elements and a finding of “dangerousness” or “vileness”?82 In 
Virginia, as in most states, defendants have an opportunity to 
demonstrate specified statutory mitigating circumstances 
                                                                                                     
 79. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (finding that the 
death penalty violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in a case where 
an accidental gun discharge during a robbery resulted in a death penalty 
sentence).  
 80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2016) (detailing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances for capital offenses in Virginia). 
 81. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C)  
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth 
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability 
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he 
is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct 
in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or 
aggravated battery to the victim. 
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regarding mental illness, such as “extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance” at the time of the offense or “the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly 
impaired.”83 Many defense attorneys worry, however, that 
evidence of mental illness will amount to a “double-edged sword” 
so that mitigation is essentially warped into aggravation.84 That 
is exactly what happened in Giarratano’s case. The trial judge 
found that both key factors regarding diminished mental 
responsibility existed in Giarratano’s case, just as the clinic 
report had stated.85 Yet he nevertheless sentenced Giarratano to 
death.86 He also interpreted one of the factors in a way that 
nullified its moral significance: by concluding that “by becoming 
an habituate of drugs and alcohol one does not cloak himself with 
immunity from penalty for his criminal acts,”87 he ignored the 
fact that Giarratano’s severe addiction—accompanied by its 
resulting psychopathology and neuropathology—had its roots in 
childhood when he was exposed to his mother’s habitual use of 
drugs and became addicted to them at a very early age.88 Nor was 
Giarratano seeking “immunity from penalty for his criminal 
acts.”89 Giarratano’s compelling moral and legal claim was simply 
that the death penalty would be disproportionate to his 
                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at § 19.2-264.4 (B).  
 84. For a more optimistic view of how supposedly “double-edged” evidence 
gets litigated today in Virginia—with far more defense victories than in the 
past—see Brandon Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death 
Penalty, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017). 
 85. See Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1078 (1980) (“The 
court concludes that the evidence of emotional stress and reduced control, while 
admissible by statute and carefully considered by the court, is not of such nature 
as to mitigate the penalty in this case.” (quoting the trial judge at Giarratano’s 
sentencing)).  
 86. Id. at 1066. 
 87. Id. (quoting the trial judge at Giarratano’s sentencing).  
 88. Id. at 1075 (“Testimony showed that the defendant . . . started using 
drugs at age 11 and that for a number of years he has had a significant drug-
alcohol problem.”).  
 89. Id. at 1078. 
1464 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445 (2016) 
culpability.90 Even if he committed the crime, as he claimed that 
he had, he should not have received a death sentence.91 
The only way to prevent this pattern of disproportionate 
capital sentencing, and to assure that compelling claims of 
diminished mental responsibility are given adequate moral 
weight, is (1) to make findings of these mitigating factors 
preclusive and (2) to require aggressive judicial review of trial 
court findings (by judges, not juries) that the evidence does not 
meet the mitigating criteria. Unfortunately, that has not 
happened in Virginia or most other states. This common 
judicial failure to take seriously the moral importance of 
proportionality in capital sentencing is one of the reasons the 
Supreme Court has precluded the death penalty altogether for 
adolescents and persons with intellectual disability.92 Now, the 
argument is being made that a finding of serious mental illness 
should also preclude the death penalty.93 In 2006, the American 
Bar Association, American Psychiatric Association, and 
American Psychological Association endorsed identical position 
                                                                                                     
 90. See id. (discussing Giarratano’s arguments that the sentence was 
“arbitrary” and “disproportionate”).  
 91. See id. (“Defendant concludes that the reasonable and just sentence, if 
the conviction is affirmed, is more properly life in the penitentiary than death.”).  
 92. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005) (explaining that the 
nature of a brutal crime might “overpower mitigating arguments based on youth 
as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, 
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe 
than death”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002) (explaining that 
intellectually disabled defendants “face a special risk of wrongful execution” 
because they may not be able to “make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the 
face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors”).  
 93. See Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death 
Penalty, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1493, 1527 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should extend Atkins to offenders who suffered from severe mental illness at the 
time they committed a capital offense); Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge and 
Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely Mentally 
Ill Capital Defendant From the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 534 (2011) 
(arguing that severe mental illness diminishes the “extreme culpability” the 
Supreme Court requires for imposition of the death penalty); Winick, supra note 
1, at 814 (“To the extent that mental illness produces effects that reduce 
volitional control and blameworthiness to the same degree as mental 
retardation and juvenile status, the imposition of the death penalty is 
insufficiently related to the purposes of capital punishment to allow its 
application consistent with the Eighth Amendment.”).  
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statements favoring this view,94 and legislation codifying this 
principle is under consideration in many states, including 
Virginia.95 
VI. Competence to Be Executed 
The Eighth Amendment bars execution of a prisoner who 
does not appreciate the nature of the punishment and the reasons 
it is being imposed.96 Fortunately this is an issue that did not 
arise in Giarratano’s case. The only point to make about it here is 
that it is unfortunately tied to the other issues that I have 
addressed, not conceptually or doctrinally but empirically. If one 
looks at the records of most prisoners whose attorneys argue that 
they are not competent to be executed, they typically were 
incompetent at earlier stages of the case.97 Unlike Giarratano, 
these defendants have typically had histories of severe mental 
illness, often including repeated episodes of psychiatric 
hospitalization.98 The records frequently indicate that their 
                                                                                                     
 94. See ABA Task Force, supra note 78, at 668: 
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if, at the 
time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder or disability 
that impaired their capacity to (a) appreciate the nature, 
consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational 
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  
See also generally Christopher Slobogin, Symposium, Mental Disorder as an 
Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA-IRR Task Force Recommendations, 
54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2005) (analyzing the Task Force’s recommendations 
for a prohibition on executing offenders whose mental disability reduced their 
culpability at the time of the offense). 
 95. See H.B. 794, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (providing that 
a defendant in a capital case who suffered from a severe mental illness at the 
time of the offense is not eligible for the death penalty and establishing 
procedures to determine the defendant’s mental status at the time of the 
offense). 
 96. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957 (2007) (discussing the 
lower court’s conclusions and finding that they were too narrow in scope) (citing 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (plurality opinion)).  
 97. See id. at 936–37 (describing Panetti’s severe mental illness prior to 
committing the offense, as well as his behavior following the offense and conduct 
at trial).  
 98. See id. at 936 (noting that Panetti had been hospitalized on multiple 
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mental and emotional functioning was significantly impaired at 
the time of the offense and that their capacity to assist in their 
own defense was at best “borderline.”99 Declaring the prisoner to 
be incompetent for execution is sometimes the last opportunity to 
rectify a moral error that was uncorrected at every previous stage 
of the criminal process.100  
VII. Conclusion 
Joe Giarratano deserves to be celebrated for his courage and 
many good deeds over the course of his imprisonment.101 It is 
time for the Commonwealth of Virginia to give him the 
opportunity to become a free man. I have chosen to pay tribute to 
Giarratano by using his case to illustrate the many ways in which 
a defendant’s serious mental illness and emotional distress can 
compromise the integrity of capital adjudication. In the absence 
of abolition, the preferred remedy for most of these deficiencies is 
to embrace prophylactic rules and safeguards to reduce the risk of 
unreliable outcomes,102 but I suspect that most of the participants 
in this Symposium are doubtful that such an approach can 
succeed. After all, we have had forty years to ascertain whether 
                                                                                                     
occasions, and, at one time, was convinced the devil had possessed his home).  
 99. See id. (“During his trial, petitioner engaged in behavior later described 
by his standby counsel as ‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and ‘trance-like.’ According to the 
attorney, petitioner’s behavior both in private and in front of the jury made it 
evident that he was suffering from ‘mental incompetence.’”); see also Richard J. 
Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and Human 
Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257, 261 (2007) [hereinafter Bonnie, Panetti v. 
Quarterman] (providing a summary of Panetti’s behavior during his trial).  
 100. See Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman, supra note 99, at 281–82 (arguing 
that prisoners who bring claims challenging their competence to be executed 
likely have a history of serious mental disorders and that fabricating 
competence claims under those circumstances is rare). 
 101. See David Margolick, Legal Scholar on Death Row Fights to Halt Own 
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at A1 (“Mr. Giarratano has fashioned novel 
legal arguments to broaden the constitutional rights of prisoners, notably their 
right to counsel.”).  
 102. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: 
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 358 & n. 5–6 (1995) (discussing the argument that the 
complexity of the procedure surrounding capital punishment delays executions 
in lieu of abolition).  
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the modern generation of capital sentencing statutes can be fairly 
administered so as to reduce arbitrariness and assure a reliable 
determination that death is morally appropriate for each 
defendant sentenced to die.103 In Giarratano’s case, a death 
sentence was not the morally appropriate sentence and the case 
reveals multiple systemic failures. While some of these systemic 
problems have been ameliorated over the past four decades, the 
unvarnished truth is that human error is an ever-present risk in 
criminal adjudication and an unacceptable one in capital 
adjudication. In telling the story of Giarratano’s case, it has been 
especially sobering for me to come face-to-face with errors of my 
own. 
                                                                                                     
 103. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) (“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying 
the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of 
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a 
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death.” (citation omitted)); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) 
(“[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the 
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that 
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of 
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”).  
